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COMPENSATING OCCUPATIONAL CANCER
IN MICHIGAN AND ONTARIO:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Leigh West*

INTRODUCTION
Occupational disease has been described as the "soft underbelly" and the
"legal stepchild"' of the workers' compensation regime. The legislative
and historical treatment of disabling occupational disease aptly attests
to this description. It is only within the last fifteen years that recognition has been given to the mounting toll taken by occupational disease
and, in particular, by occupationally-induced cancer. As statistical and
scientific evidence accumulates, there is an increasing understanding and
awareness of the causal link between toxic substances in the workplace
and certain forms of cancer.2 There is as yet no reliable mechanism for
ascertaining and recording the total incidence of this dread disease.
However, it is widely believed that cancer is underreported as an occupational illness and undercompensated by worker compensation regimes?
A basic premise of this paper is that it is desirable as a policy objective
to compensate workers who suffer from occupationally-induced disease.
While the worker compensation legislation in most jurisdictions in
North America purports to cover all industrial disease, in reality few
workers receive compensation for work-related illness. This lapse in the
system results in inequity. Where occupational disease goes uncompensated, the costs inflicted by illness are not internalized by industry as
part of the cost of the production of goods and services. Instead, the costs
* Copyright @1987 Leigh West. Leigh West is an Assistant Professor at the
Faculty of Law of the University of Windsor, in Ontario.

1 P. Weiler, Protecting the Worker from Disability: Challenges for the Eighties
(Ontario Government Report 10) (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1983).

S. Epstein, The Politics of Cancer (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1978) at 79149. Epstein notes the link between cancer and the following carcinogens: asbestos, vinyl chloride, bischloromethyl ether, benzene et al.
3 N. Ashford, Crisis in the Workplace (Boston: MIT Press, 1976) at 84, 92.
Ashford believes that illness and injury reporting practices in the U.S. are deficient and that many occupational illnesses are treated under general health programs. See also Laurence Locke, "Adapting Workers' Compensation to the
Special Problems of Occupational Disease" 9 Harvard Environmental Law
Review 249 at 261. Locke states that many workers seek alternative means of
compensation because of the financial and legal obstacles facing occupational
illness claimants.
2
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which should be attributable to industry are transferred to the individual worker, to insurers, to social welfare agencies, and ultimately to all
of us.4 The employer has, therefore, no incentive to spend money on prevention or on enhancing the safety of the workplace and the cost allocation objective of the worker compensation concept is undermined.
This paper proposes to examine the compensation of occupationallyinduced cancer in two very different jurisdictions, Michigan and Ontario.
These jurisdictions, although situated in two different countries, have in
common a number of factors such as geographic proximity, similar industries, similar sized working populations and relatively progressive
worker compensation legislation. The purpose of comparing the two
jurisdictions, which have taken widely differing approaches to compensation, is to illuminate the various issues surrounding the compensation
of cancer in order to help clarify and focus the difficulties encountered by
claimants.
The first part of this paper briefly examines the nature and dimensions
of the problem of occupational cancer. The legislative and administrative frameworks in the two jurisdictions are reviewed as Part Two.
Finally, the paper considers some possible reforms which are suggested
by the experience of the compared jurisdictions.
COMPENSATING WORKPLACE CANCER:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
After heart disease, cancer is the second leading cause of death in both
Canada and the U.S. 5 Yet cancer claims represent only a tiny fraction of
the claims for worker compensation in both countries.6 One possible
explanation for this is that the workplace does not contribute to cancer,
but the evidence against this claim and in favour of occupationally
related causes is steadily mounting and more and more compelling.
Ashford found general agreement among cancer researchers that approximately half of all cancer cases are complicated by occupational factors!
Certainly there is little doubt that certain identified occupations such as
asbestos mining and manufacturing, certain processes in the rubber and
chemical industries and processes in dust-related industries are well
known to be associated with an "excess" number of cancer cases.
4 U.S. Dept. of Labor, An Interim Report to Congress on Occupational Disease

(1980) [Hereafter, Interim Report]. This report cites a study of workers which

found that in 1974 only 5% of occupational disease victims received compensation, while 53% relied on Social Security, 16% on "public welfare" and 21% on pension and other insurance funds.
s P. Weiler, supra, note I at 19.
6 Ashford, supra, note 3 at 93. Weiler, supra note 1 at 19.
7 Ibid. at 11.
8 See Fraumini, ed. Persons at High Risk of Cancer (New York: Academic Press,

1975) at 167-184.
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In spite of increasing evidence that the workplace is a contributing factor
in many disabling diseases, the overall percentage of occupational diseases which are compensated is very small. Weiler examined general
disease and accident statistics and observed that in the general population of Ontario the vast majority of fatalities are attributable to disabling diseases whereas the bulk of the Ontario worker compensation
claims were for accidental injury. Less than 2% of the total claims were
for cancer. 9 Similar statistics exist in the United States. A study sponsored by NIOSH (National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health) notes that, in the United States, the probable incidence of occupational disease was 28.4 cases per 100 workers whereas only a 3% incidence rate was found in worker compensation records." Estimates as to
what percentage of cancers are occupationally induced have proven to be
extremely controversial and range from 1% to 40% depending on the
source presenting the statistics. At one extreme, an Estimates Paper by
NIOSH predicts that 23% to 38% of all future cancers will be attributable to the workplace." Other more conservative studies, such as the
study conducted by Doll and Peto12 rebutting the Estimates Paper have
strongly attacked this statistic and impute only 4% of cancers to the
workplace. Weiler, who has canvassed several scientific studies in both
jurisdictions suggests that a conservative estimate lies between 1%and
10% of the total incidence.13 However, even acknowledging the controversy, it is generally agreed that work-induced cancer is greatly underestimated and that there are a significant number of occupational cancers
which go unrecognized and uncompensated.
The major obstacle faced by any worker who believes his or her cancer is
of occupational origin is to establish a causative link between the cancer
and the workplace. 4 Proof that a cancer originated in the workplace is
complicated by the very nature of the disease itself since medical science
has yet to determine with any certainty the etiology of the disease.
Cancer can be caused by a multiplicity of factors, many of which are nonoccupational in part. Smoking, lifestyle, diet, a genetic predisposition
and changes due to aging are all complicating factors in determining
9 Weiler, supra,note I at 16.
10 This study was cited by Ashford, supra, note 3 at 11. Also see Note,
"Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease", (1980) Harv. L. Rev. 916 (compensation is provided annually to approximately 30,000 occupational disease
claims, less than 1/3 of the estimated number of fatalities and only 1/13 of the
number of occupational illnesses).
11 Weiler, supra, note 1 at 20.
12 See Doll and Peto, "The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of
Avoidable Risk of Cancer in the United States" (1981) 66 Journal of the National
Cancer Institute 6.
13 Weiler, supra, note I at 21.
14 T. Ison, The Dimensions of Industrial Disease, (Kingston: Industrial Relations
Centre, 1978) (Research and Current Issues Series No. 35, 0317-2546).
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causation. In addition, many cancers may only be manifested after a long
latency period, and certain characteristics of a delayed cancer are manifested coincidentally during the aging process. The unfortunate worker
who suffers from this invisible disease, of multiple etiology, which is
manifested only after employment at a number of workplaces or after
retirement, is clearly going to have difficulty in meeting the eligibility
requirements for compensation. Moreover, the worker's doctor may not be
trained to detect or consider a causal relationship between the cancer and
the workplace." Many attending physicians fail to take account of the
occupational history of their patients. 1 6 Occupational medicine is not a
significant part of the training of physicians and doctors may inadvertently screen out potential worker compensation claims. 7
Other, more pragmatic, problems are also inherent in the proof of causation. A worker who has had multiple employers may have been distanced from the possible sources of his or her exposure and may not be
aware of the health hazards he or she has faced in some prior workplace.18 Even if a particular workplace is suspect, there may be no written record of an exposure to an occupational hazard as employers may not
themselves have sufficient knowledge of their workplace chemicals. In
other cases, there have been well documented instances where employers
have withheld information needed to establish claims. 9 In modern
workplaces thousands of new toxic substances, many untested, are being
introduced constantly without any systematic program for monitoring or
testing them.' ° Although exposure guidelines (Threshold Limit Values)
are being developed and adopted as standards in the United States and
Canada, there is clear evidence that, for some identified carcinogens any
exposure can initiate cancer.21 The synergistic effect of toxins remains
another mystery and poses an awesome task for study. However, even

's p. Barth and H. Hunt, Workers' Compensation and Work-Related Illnesses,

(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980) at 85.
16 Id. at 87. See also Ison, supra, note 14 at 15.
17 Ison, supra,note 14 at 3.

Barth and Hunt, supra, note 15 at 63. See also Ashford, supra,note 3 at 408.
lbid., Ashford at 50-52. Numerous instances of employer cover-ups have been
documented, the most notorious being the failure of the Johns-Manville company to warn workers about the asbestos hazards. For a popular account of this
case see Brodeur, P. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial.
Also see D. Berman, Death on the Job : Occupational Health and Safety
Struggles in the United States (1978).
20 E. Schroeder and S. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of
Markets, Regulation and Information (1984) at 1232. A news report in the
Washington Post, 13 February 1977, at A7, Col. 1 reported that of the 20,000
harmful substances on the Toxic Substance List, only 500 have exposure standards. Barth, supra, note 14 at 48 notes that estimates of the numbers of new
chemicals introduced annually into the workplace range from 500 to 1,000.
21 Ashford, supra, note 3 at 118, 119.
18
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when carcinogens have been identified in the workplace there is still
the problem of proving causation. Some "signature cancers" have been
accepted in Ontario as work-induced,22 but overall the true incidence of
cancer causes by workplace exposure continues to be debated.
Virtually the only causation evidence available to the worker is provided by epidemiological studies and these are not without their difficulties.' In the first place, they are often carried out by the industry
concerned and therefore many workers and worker advocates consider
their results to be biased, self-serving and suspect. Other major disadvantages to such studies are that they are difficult to design, they are
largely retrospective, researchers have difficulty accessing data existing in the employer's medical files and finally, such studies are unreliable as predictors of health and safety for ethical and practical reasons.24
However, in spite of these drawbacks, epidemiological studies remain
the claimant's major and often sole proof of causation. Workers must rely
on these studies to provide evidence that statistically significant excess
numbers of cancers are produced in various industries where identified
toxins are used. Epidemiological data can establish that a worker
exposed to a certain toxin will have a greater probability of contracting
a disease. Research evidence, however, is not easily translated into legislation, legal argument, or policy considerations. A compensation system is concerned not with groups and statistical probabilities, but with a
single disabled individual worker who must persuade an adjudicator
that his or her illness is work-related. The solid data required of a
scientific proof is impossible to provide given the current state of medical knowledge.
Another stumbling block and one which is difficult to document but is
nevertheless extremely important, is the attitude brought to the decision-making process by the evaluator of the claim. The adjudicator,
whether it be the Board in Ontario or the judge in Michigan, must decide
Weiler, supra, note 1 at 22. The best examples cited are the established link
between mesothelioma and asbestos exposure and angiosarcoma and exposure
to vinyl chloride.
23 See in general: Dore, "ACommentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence
in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact" (1983) 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 429; and see Hall &
Silbergeld, "Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore" (1983) 7 Harv.
Envtl. L.Rev. 441.
22

24

See Proceedings of the National Conference on Workers' Compensation and

Workplace Liability (National Legal Centre for the Public Interest, 1981) "Can
the Compensation System Cope with Occupational Disease" at 359.
25 See O.E. Tilevitz, "Judicial Attitudes Towards Legal and Scientific Proof of
Cancer Causation" (1977) 3 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 344 for a full
discussion of the problem of scientific proof. See also Ison, supra, note 13 at 9.
Ison states, "On any question of employment causation there appears to be a
widespread feeling in the medical profession that the absence of positive data
requires a negative assumption."
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a scientific/medical question in the legal context within the parameters
of the worker compensation system. There is considerable confusion, particularly as to the interconnection of medicine and law, and there is a
definite tendency for evaluators to place almost total reliance on medical evidence. 26 Therefore, while the intent of the legislation may be to
compensate all occupational illness, the reality is that enormous evidentiary problems face the worker. The only evidence can be circumstantial,
and adjudicators must make a distinction between what constitutes a
scientific proof and what is sufficient for a legal proof.?7 While accidental injury lends itself easily to proof and is accommodated by worker
compensation systems, the reverse is true for occupational disease.
Worker compensation experts were designed to compensate accidents,
they are unresponsive and ill-suited to deal with and accomodate disabling illness, such as cancer.
It is not surprising, then, that in both Michigan and Ontario, only a
small percentage of cancer cases are reported. An examination of the two
jurisdictions reveals the problems each has in coping with the complexities surrounding occupational cancer.
THE BASIC WORKER COMPENSATION REGIMES:
MICHIGAN AND ONTARIO
The basic framework of all worker compensation schemes evolved from
the historic tradeoff agreement between employees and employers. This
agreement barred the employee's right to sue his or her employer for
workplace injury in exchange for a statutory right to claim compensation
from an employer irrespective of fault. This trade off insured the injured
worker the legal right to obtain compensation and removed worker compensation from the category of social welfare activity. The development
of compensation schemes however, took different forms in the various
jurisdictions, and Michigan and Ontario represent schemes at polar ends
of the procedural continuum with Michigan utilizing an adversarial litigation model and Ontario characterized by a huge bureacratic administrative model. The Michigan system is essentially a private law, courtbased, adversarial system in which the immediate employer is protected from strict liability by a system of private insurance or through a
self-insurance program. In some cases (dust diseases, for example) insurance is provided by special funds set up to protect certain high risk
industries from exorbitant compensation costs.' Otherwise, all medical,
26

Ibid ., Tilevitz at 354.

Large and Michie, "Proving that the Strength of the British Navy Depends on
the Number of Old Maids in England: A Comparison of Scientific Proof with
Legal Proof' (1981) 11 Envtl. L. Rev. 557.
27

28

See Michigan Worker Compensation Act (MCLA) 418.101-941.
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hospital, rehabilitation and compensation costs are paid by the
employer's insurance. Under this system, unless the injured worker's
claim is voluntarily accepted (and it usually is for accidental injury) the
worker must resort to litigation through the courts. He or she must establish that the disability experienced, "arises out of and in the course of
employment".29 A Worker Compensation Bureau facilitates the administration of the Michigan Worker Compensation Act but the backbone of
the adversary process remains the workers' compensation bar which litigates the contested cases.
In Ontario's compensation system workers are covered under two
Schedules. Schedule 1 applies to the bulk of all covered workers while
Schedule 2 applies to certain government, transportation and other specific categories of workers. For workers and employers under Schedule 2,
the system operates much as it does in Michigan but for those employers
and employees covered under Schedule 1, and these are the vast majority, there are fundamental differences."
Under Ontario's compensation system for Schedule 1 workers there is a
comprehensive public insurance fund which is financed by regular assessments on employers. This fund is administered by the Ontario Workers'
Compensation Board, a bureaucratic body employing a diverse array of
professionals, including several physicians and medical researchers.
This Board is mandated to perform investigatory, research and adjudicative functions. While it is not responsible for hospital or medical costs
(these are covered through the provincial health insurance plan) it pays
compensation benefits under a structure of benefits laid out in the Ontario
Workers' Compensation Act 31 . It also conducts epidemiological studies
from time to time, funds safety associations, and sets out general policy
criteria governing compensable claims. Under the Ontario system, an
injured worker files a claim and the Board itself launches an investigation into its merits.
Once the Board adjudicates a claim, there is an appeal procedure culminating in a final appeal to a tripartite Workers' Compensation Appeal
Tribunal. A final resort to the courts by way of judicial review is available on questions of law alone but this avenue is rarely pursued, and when
it is the courts have traditionally deferred to the Workers'
Compensation Board.32
" MCLA 481.401.

These differences in the two Schedules in Ontario worker compensation law
were the subject of an unsuccessful constitutional challenge under the Canadian
30

Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

31Worker Compensation Act,

R.S.O. 1980, c. 539.
Recently the Ontario Divisional Court broke tradition and sought to correct an
interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Board. On appeal to the Ontario
32

Court of Appeal, the higher court reversed the decision preferring to defer to the
Board. See Kuntz v. Workers' Compensation Board; Dagenais v. Workers'
Compensation Board 56 O.R. 497.
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Clearly, the two systems have chosen very different mechanisms to
administer and regulate worker compensation, and neither system is
without its difficulties. It is instructive and revealing to note how such
differently structured systems address the very complex and intractable
problem of compensating workers for occupational cancer.
OCCUPATIONAL CANCER COMPENSATION:
MICHIGAN AND ONTARIO
There is no clear cut category in the compensation data of either
Michigan or Ontario which sets out the claims for cancer. It is only by
scrutinizing the categories and selecting those which are obviously cancer that any comparison can be made and even then such comparisons are
tentative at best. However, the exercise is worthwhile because, even
though the data are crude, they indicate a large discrepancy between
the two jurisdictions. It is also noteworthy that both jurisdictions purport to provide coverage for all occupational disease. The following
table provides some summary data descriptive of the two jurisdictions.
Table 1
Some Basic Comparative Measures (1985)"3
Michigan
Ontario
Population
9,088,000a
9,064,200b
Employed Workers

4,352,000c

4,787,000d

Approved Cancer
9e
40f
Claims
As can be seen, the two jurisdictions are essentially the same size in terms
of population and of employed workers covered by the respective
regimes, but cancer claims were approved more than four times more frequently in Ontario than in Michigan.

33 Sources of data:

a)
b)
c)
d)

Statistical Abstract of the USA, 1987;
Ontario Statistics, 1986;
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Geographic Profile, 1985;
Statistics Canada, 1986;

e) MIOSHA (Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act) Information

Section, Michigan Department of Labor, 1985;
f) Ontario Workers' Compensation Board 1985 - Final Report; Occupational
Diseases.
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ONTARIO
The Ontario worker compensation regime is widely acknowledged to be a
progressive, leading jurisdiction with respect to worker compensation
and ranks second behind Sweden in a worldwide survey of industrial disease awards.34 The following table compiled by Barth gives some indication of the volume of claims between 1974 and 1980.
Table 2 3'
Industrial
Disease
Claims

All Fatal
Claims

All Cancer
Claims

All Fatal
All
Industrial
Fatal Cancer
Disease Claims
Claims

Year

All Claims

1980

411,476

7,611

324

64

94

42

1979

413,008

7,829

323

66

119

33

1978

385,945

6,834

261

41

84

29

1977

395,146

7,691

226

50

N.A.

N.A.

1976

433,799

6,310

293

38

N.A.

N.A.

1975

395,528

4,990

N.A.

16

N.A.

N.A.

1974 443,000
5,002
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Barth finds it noteworthy that deaths due to cancer were over 10% of all
compensated fatality claims for workers' compensation in Ontario for
the years 1978-1980. In 1983 fatal malignancies accounted for 12.5% of
occupational disease fatal claims. While industrial disease claims are
only a fraction of all claims, these figures suggest that Ontario is in the
forefront of many jurisdictions in its compensation of cancer cases.3'
Even so, the Ontario worker compensation system is not without its critics, and in the 1970's there was a strong call for an overhaul and reform of
the system. A steady barrage of criticism resulted in the Ontario
Government ordering an inquiry into the worker compensation regime in
the province. The initial inquiry was conducted by Paul Weiler, a noted
industrial relations expert. Weiler's first report, Reshaping Workers'
Compensation for Ontario (1978), focussed on reform of the administrative and benefit structure and was followed by a white paper and a draft
statute in the spring of 1981. The proposed amendments came into force
34 A U.S. Department of Labor Study, The Interim Report to Congress on
Occupational Disease (1980). Sweden was first and was found to compensate
occupational disease 11 times more often than was the U.S. Ontario compensated 4.5 times more frequently.
35 P. Barth, Report of the Royal Commission on Matters of Health and Safety
Arising from the Use of Asbestos in Ontario, Workers' Compensation and
Asbestos
in Ontario, (1982) at 6.2.
36
ibid.
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on October 1, 1985. The second report, entitled Protecting the Worker
from Disability: Challenge for the Eighties (1983) focussed on a number
of fundamental and controversial issues concerning problems of disability
policy and notably problems surrounding the issue of industrial disease.
As a result of the first report the Ontario Workers Compensation Board
underwent significant structural reforms. However, with some exceptions, the fundamental problems associated with occupational disease
cases have not been addressed directly by the new amendments, and
Weiler's recommendations resulting from the second report remain to be
considered.
As a result of the amendments, the definition of occupational disease has
been considerably broadened. Section 1(n) provides:
(n) "industrial disease" includes,
(i) a disease resulting from exposure to a substance relating to
a particular process, a trade or occupation in an industry,
(ii) a disease peculiar to or characteristic of a particular
industrial process, trade or occupation,
(iii) a medical condition that,in the opinion of the Board,
requires a worker to be removed either temporarily or permanently from exposure to a substance because the condition may
be a precursor to an industrial disease, or
(iv) any of the diseases mentioned in Schedule 3 or 4;
Schedule 4 has not yet been established. It is contemplated that the new
Industrial Diseases Standards Panel will draft it.
Schedule 3 sets out a schedule of prescribed diseases which are linked to
occupations or processes in the workplace. The Board publishes these
disease guidelines in a Worker Compensation Claim Manual which is
available to the public. The guidelines are established on the basis of
Board experience with certain claims. The diseases listed are described
very generally, allowing some flexibility in interpretation. When several claims for a specific disease begin to develop, the Board may eventually list the disease in the Schedule and the disease is presumed to be
work-related. Thereafter, a worker who suffers from one of the listed
diseases, and who has worked in a listed occupation and has been
exposed to the toxin for the prescribed period, is presumed to have contracted the disease at work. These presumptive standards establish a
set of conditions which relieve claimants from the necessity of proving
causation. In the past the standards have been set by ad hoc procedures
internal to the Board but the newly established tripartite Industrial
Disease Standards Panel is now responsible for setting criteria for the
evaluation of industrial disease claims and for advising the Board on
the eligibility requirements regarding such claims. There is already
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some evidence that this Panel will expand the present guidelines, with
the result that
more workplace cancer victims may receive
7
compensation
The list of diseases provided in the schedule is not exhaustive and there
is a catch-all provision to cover unscheduled diseases. Therefore, a
worker who has a type of cancer which is not listed but which comes
within the definition of industrial diseases, may be compensated if the
Board physician or the Panel believes the cancer to be work-related. The
Board then proceeds to decide the case on its individual merit giving the
worker the benefit of the doubt. 38
With respect to limitation periods, the Board does not set any notice periods on occupational disease claims and remains willing to reopen a
claim whenever new scientific information become available. On occasion the Board has undertaken outreach programs and has conducted its
own investigations of workplace exposure to hazardous toxins.3 9 It will
alert workers that they may have a claim if it finds reason to suspect a
health hazard is present.
The Board is not required to follow precedent in making its decisions and
it has only begun to publish its decisions since the establishment of the
Workers Compensation Appeals Tribunal.
MICHIGAN
The Michigan Worker Compensation system is also considered to be a
progressive jurisdiction in its coverage of occupational disease relative to
other States. 40 It has adopted reasonable time limitations which run
from discovery of the disease and it does not impose minimum time exposure periods found in other states. However, the problematic area of
occupational disease, which is of national concern41 , does not appear to be
a priority in Michigan, and recent Michigan worker compensation studies

A recent study by Dr. Jan Muller (The Mortality of Ontario Miners' from 19551977) showed that excessive numbers of cancer victims were found among gold

37

miners in Northern Ontario. More than 430 cancer claims have been brought
before the Board. The Industrial Disease Standards Panel is currently reviewing
the claims and will establish the criteria from which for compensation, says
WCB The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (11 March 1987) A4.
38 See Ontario Worker Compensation Board, Board Policies and Administrative
Directives, Toronto (looseleaf).
39 Barth, supra, note 34 at 7.1-7.5. Outreach programs were initiated in 1976 and
1979 to identify potential asbestos victims.
40 See Analysis of Workmen's Compensation Laws (Washington: Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, 1983).
41 See Assistant Secretary for Policy Evaluation & Research, U.S. Dept. of Labor,
An Interim Report to Congress on Occupational Disease (1980) at 66.
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give very sparse treatment to the subject. In a study by Hunt discussing
the problems and prospects of worker compensation in Michigan, there is
absolutely no mention of occupational disease. Welchs 43 review of the
worker compensation system in Michigan treats the subject briefly, noting
that it is in a confused and uncertain state. Recent studies of the
Michigan system have focussed on the benefit structure, and the recent
amendment to the legislation was mainly concerned with the coordination of benefits. As in other states, there is a strong lobby against
increased compensation costs by the insurance industry, workers' compensation defence lawyers, and employers. Statistics indicating the volume
of occupational disease cases reflect the success of thisvpolitical force. In
1983, only 4 cancer cases were reported by employers. The overall incidence of cancer is hard to assess from MIOSHA data as it is loosely categorized and there is a large non-classifiable category included in the
occupational disease breakdown 5
The Michigan regime is based on a diverse and highly individual proof
system with adjudication on a case by case basis. At one time the
Michigan legislation had an enumerated schedule of 31 specific diseases
but this schedule was dropped in 1943. The present statute defines occupational disease in s. 401(2)(b):
s. 401(2)(b) "Personal injury" shall include a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and
which arises out of and in the course of the employment. An
ordinary disease of life to which the public is generally
exposed outside of the employment is not compensable. Mental
diseases and conditions of the aging process, including but not
limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated by the employment in
a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of employment not
unfounded perceptions thereof. A hernia to be compensable
must be clearly recent in origin and result from strain arising
out of and in the course of the employment and be promptly
reported to the employer.
Pursuant to the definition, a worker who believes his or her cancer to be
occupationally related must prove 1) it arose out of and in the course of
42

H.A. Hunt, Worker's Compensation in Michigan: Problems and Prospects,

(Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn, Institute for Employment Research, 1979).
43 Welch, Worker's Compensation in Michigan, ((Ann Arbor: Michigan
Continuing Education, 1984) at 90.
" Information received from the MIOSHA Information Section, Michigan
Department of Labor, 1983.
45 The MIOSHA data (1983) on the Nature of Injury or Illness lists as nonclassifiable 1,544 cases or 2.9% of all injuries or illnesses.
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employment and 2) that the employment is one giving rise to a "peculiar
risk" of disease and 3) that the disease is not "an ordinary disease of
life" to which the general public is exposed."'
The test to determine whether or not a disease is compensable and not an
"ordinary disease of life" is set out in the case of Roberts v. Western
Michigan Foundry, [19801 WCABO 2028. Billman, Chairman of the
Appeal Board states the test. He observes, 'What is crucial is the quality, nature and relative uniqueness of the work performed or the exposure
endured." 7 The opinion also quotes Larson on occupational disease cases.
Larson refers to "the typical occupational disease."
'The cause is characteristic harmful conditions of the particular industry. The result is a kind of disability which is not
expected if work under these conditions continues for a long
time. And the development is usually gradual and imperceptible over the extended period." 8
The two definitions are broad and relatively open-ended. Michigan's
adoption of such a general definition, both in the statute and as
expressed in the caselaw, allows the court, if it wishes, to take an expansive view of the causal relationship between the disease and the
employment. However, the words "peculiar to the industry' and "not a
disease of ordinary life" have served to limit the number of occupational
disease awards. Few cancers are so unique as to automatically implicate
a particular industrial process or workplace. Many diseases of occupational origin are manifested as ordinary illnesses which affect the general population. 49 The 1972 National Commission on Workmen's
Compensation recommended the elimination of these requirements on the
grounds that they have no medical significance and because they fail to
take into account the multiple etiology of many diseases. Michigan has
chosen to retain them.
A survey of the reported caselaw concerned with occupational disease
and specifically with cancer indicates that very few cases of occupational disease are being litigated. At the Supreme Court level, there is
one worker compensation cancer case dating from 1958, Wilson v.
Doehler-Jarvis Division of the National Lead Company 91 NW
Reporter 538. In this unusual case the plaintiff, the wife of the deceased
worker, was able to prove a causal relationship between a blow on the
jaw received during the course of her husband's employment and metastasized cancer which ultimately caused his death. This case is unique
as it is one of the rare cases in the entire United States in which cancer
46MCLA, s. 418 and 401.
47 [1980] W.C.A.B.O. 2031

at 2035.
A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §37.20.
49 M. Solomons, "Workers' Compensation for Occupational Disease Victims:
Federal Standards and Threshold Problems" 41 Albany Law Rev. 195 at 199.
48

(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy

was found to have been caused by trauma. Otherwise, there are no cases
at the Supreme Court level and very few in -the lower courts.
Significantly, in a very recent 1985 consolidated case, Larson v. JohnsManville Sales Corporation365 NW Reporter 194, four plaintiffs alleging asbestos exposure caused cancer bypassed the worker compensation
system entirely and filed wrongful death actions in tort. It can only be
presumed that cancer cases are not being filed or htigated by workers, an
assumption that seems likely in the light of the experience elsewhere."0
Moreover, because of the difficulty the worker has in proving causation,
occupational disease claims are 6 times more likely to be contested by the
employer than are accidental injury claims.51 The following table,
drawn from a U.S. Department of Labor Interim Report, suggests the rate
of litigation for occupational disease cases, and for cancer claims in
particular. 52
Table 3
Percent of Cases Contested by Category of Disease
Category
Percent
Dust Diseases
88
Disorders Due to Repeated Traumas
86
Respiratory Conditions Due to Toxic Agents
79
Cancers and Tumors
Poisoning

46
37

Skin Diseases
Disorders Due to Physical Agents

14

Other
All Diseases

54
63

10

All Accidents
10
In addition, the same study suggests that industrial disease claims tend
to be delayed, arduous and more costly to the claimant. Insurers have,
therefore, more incentive to fight them." Consequently, a worker fearing

A study reported by Barth and Hunt, supra, note 15 at 88 found that out of a
possible 51 cases of occupational disease for respiratory disease only 1 was
reported.
So

s Interim Report, supra, note 4 at 69-70. In 73% of all contested cases, causation
5was the issue.
2 Ibid.
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the delay of a long uncertain court battle and being in need of a present
source of income, is under pressure to settle the claim.
Since there is only scant data in Michigan as to the numbers of work
related cancer cases and very little caselaw, it is difficult to draw any
firm conclusions. The lack of caselaw and the sparse data, however,
strongly suggest that occupationally induced cancers are not being
reported or compensated.
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The fundamental differences between the compensation approaches
taken by Michigan and Ontario are obvious. While the Ontario system
is administered by a massive central bureaucracy which sets occupational disease policy, establishes guidelines and then adjudicates, the
Michigan system is centered around the adversary system with the trial
lawyer playing a pivotal role. Michigan determines occupational disease cases and the problem of causation on a case by case basis through a
process of litigation while Ontario relies on a structured system of presumptions and guidelines with some provision for individual case
adjudication.
The major criticism which can be directed against the adversarial system is that it involves very high transaction costs for the worker in the
form of litigation costs, contingency fees, delays and finally, the effort
required to go through the adversarial process itself.' As a result, the
record of compensating occupational cancer is very poor. On the positive
side, an ingenious and alert plaintiff's bar has the potential to advance
the law if it meets with a liberal and cooperative bench. The legal literature in the U.S. has begun to present detailed and cogent strategies for
fighting occupational disease cases-' A persuasive and knowledgeable
plaintiffs bar will be crucial in achieving a better understanding of the
evidentiary problems surrounding proof of causation. A change in judicial attitude would, by itself, set the stage for a recognition of occupaId. at 3. A disabled worker with an occupational disease must wait approximately 1 year before receiving benefits, while an accidentally injured worker
waits approximately two months or less.
54 M. Reutter, "Workman's Compensation Doesn't Work or Compensate" [1980]
Bus. and Society Review 43. Reutter cites a Dept. of Labor study which found
that of the $13 billion paid into the compensation program by business in 1978,
about $5.5 billion (42 cents of each dollar) was spent on administrative and legal
costs.
55 See for example, S. Birnbaum, J. Oshinsky, Occupational Disease Litigation,
(Practicing Law Institute, 1983). See also Tilevitz, supra, note 25 at 344. Tilevitz
proposes a particular model of carcinogenesis which is useful for legal analysis
and which can be used to form the basis for a strong legal argument on compensating cancer.
S3
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tional cancer. Unless courts are prepared to accept a standard of proof
which reflects the realities of scientific uncertainty, there will continue
to be a problem of undercompensation of occupational disease. The potential exists for an appropriate and well argued case to spearhead through
and dramatically change the present situation of avoiding the compensation system where occupational disease cases are in issue. To date,
however, Michigan courts have been unwilling to recognize the problems,
and there has been a noticeable trend for aggrieved workers to circumvent the worker compensation system by taking third party action,
a
56
practice which will ultimately weaken and break down the system.
The presumptive standards and guidelines utilized by the Ontario
Worker Compensation Board also have the potential of providing a liberal and progressive system of compensation. They have the advantage
of clarifying the claimant's burden of proof and they reduce the uncertainty as to whether or not a claim will be accepted. The Ontario Board
has a mandate to inform the public and to consult with diverse interest
groups in devising guidelines. The formation of the Industrial Disease
Standards Panel with its mandate to consult and oversee the creation of
guidelines should increase the flexibility in applying the guidelines and
should improve the public image surrounding the application of the criteria.5 7 A worker who might not otherwise have been aware of the link
between the workplace and a specific disease may have the opportunity
to become informed.
However, presumptions can also be used as a device to deny claims to
workers whose illnesses, workplace processes and exposure periods do not
meet with the guidelines. While there are safeguards built into the legislation in Ontario, there is considerable discretion left to the Board in
interpreting its guidelines. The danger alway remains that the presumptions become inflexible and rigid rules. The Board must also recognize the employer's concern that presumptions bypass scientific proof and
that they inevitably, in a certain percentage of cases, compensate an
individual whose disease was, in fact, not work-related. The tensions
existing within the Board in its attempt to balance the welfare of the
worker with the legitimate interests of the employer are indeed
substantial.

56
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Liability Cases (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: DRI Defence Research Institute, 1984).
Also see Proceedings, supra, note 24 at 115: Birnbaum, "Inroads in the Immunity
Shield: Employee Tort Actions Against Employers".
57 There has been a general feeling among workers that the criteria in applying
the guidelines were followed too rigidly.
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The worker compensation systems in both jurisdictions are subject to
political stresses. Although the Ontario Board is at least theoretically
autonomous and has full authority to determine all matters arising in
the administration of its legislation, it is often the target of opposing
political parties and cannot help being influenced by the political climate. The new structures, the Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal
and the Industrial Disease Standards Panel should help reduce the
political machinations surrounding the Board and may create a more
open decision-making process.
In Michigan, the 1981 amendment reflects the political climate and suggests an overriding concern with cost and less with attempting to increase
the level of occupational disease compensation. In fact, there is no evidence in Michigan that there is any well defined policy or political consensus that it is even desirable to have adequate, certain compensation
for occupational disease. Although federal studies and reports indicate
that the undercompensation of disease is a problem 8 which must be
addressed, there is no evidence to suggest that Michigan policymakers
regard occupational disease as a priority or even as a problem. Without
the political will to utilize the present system to compensate disease,
the system will continue to function poorly and the workers will either
remain uncompensated and rely on social welfare programs or they will
circumvent the system and sue in tort, thus undercutting the whole purpose of the original worker compensation agreement.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: MICHIGAN AND ONTARIO
One outcome of a comparative study is the opportunity to examine what
lessons one system can learn from the other. However, comparing jurisdictions in different countries must be approached cautiously as the
political, sociological, cultural and historical differences between countries make comparisons difficult and mitigate against merely transferring ideas or concepts from one society to another and expecting them to
work. For example, the role of the trial lawyer is integral to the
Michigan system and, although lawyers are often criticized for increasing the cost of the system 9 and for undermining the system by third party
actions,' they are unlikely to be dislodged easily from their position.
Therefore, whatever reforms might be suggested by the Ontario system
must be adapted to the adversarial system in Michigan, and vice-versa.

s8 See the Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's
Compensation Laws (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972) and see also the Interim
Report, supra, note 4.

s9
Ruetter, supra, note 52 at 39. See also supra, note 24 at 3.
60 Supra,
note 24 at 278.
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In the view of this writer, the threshold and most difficult problem facing the disabled cancer victim in Michigan is the reluctance of some
groups to accept worker compensation as a right and not merely a privilege. From a statutory perspective, the possibility exists for courts to
interpret occupational disease liberally and to take an expansionist
approach to compensation for possible work-induced cancer. If the historic trade off agreement is to be respected, then worker compensation
cannot be regarded as a form of welfare legislation. Until there is more
interest in, and a change of attitude towards, the problem of compensation for occupational disease, there will not be much chance of meaningful reform.
Another major difficulty with this system, which has partially been
overcome in Ontario, is the problem of proof. An obvious option for
Michigan is the re-establishment of some form of presumptive schedule
with a catchall provision for the appearance of an unscheduled occupational disease. This would introduce some certainty about the range of
coverage available for cancer cases and would shift the burden of proof to
the insurer except for the unscheduled cases. Such presumptive schedules
must be continually up-dated to reflect current scientific developments,
and some form of independent, perhaps tripartite, Medical Review
Board, similar to the Ontario Industrial Disease Standards Panel could
be established to develop and oversee the development of the schedules.
Another reform suggested by the Ontario experience but dependent on
policy objectives in Michigan, is to set up programs through the worker
compensation bureau to better inform workers and employers about occupational health hazards. While this is already a goal of NIOSH and
OSHA(federal Occupational Safety and Health Act), some greater
effort is needed to disseminate information with respect to disease.
Moreover, the need to inform attending physicians and other health professionals of workers' rights with respect to compensation for certain
types of cancer and disease is also evident.
The centralized Board in Ontario greatly facilitates data gathering and
evaluation of what diseases get compensated. Reliable data also give
the Board the opportunity to monitor and evaluate its activities in specific areas. While MIOSHA compiles data obtained from employers'
reports of injury, this source has been seriously questioned as unreliable."
Employers certainly have no incentive to report possible cancer links to
the workplace. Therefore, some more objective source of data would be
desirable. Some studies have suggested the establishment of a national
or state cancer registry or some similar central occupational disease data
gathering body in order that a more accurate picture of the true situation
may emerge.62 Finally there has been some suggestion by worker compen61
62
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sation experts that occupational disease be dealt with under separate
legislation, even perhaps some type of comprehensive insurance program, if worker compensation agencies do not begin to adequately deal
with the problem. This suggestion for reform seems unlikely to be
accepted in Michigan unless there is some dramatic change in attitude
towards compensating occupational disease.
The Ontario system has undergone major structural changes very recently
and therefore it is somewhat early to predict whether or not a concerted
effort will be made to discover and compensate workplace cancers. The
new Appeal Tribunal and the Industrial Disease Standards Panel were
established with the intent of democratizing the internal procedures to
make them more open to outside input and less secretive. The Panel is
required to hold public hearings and to receive comments from interested
parties in an effort to include more public participation in the decisionmaking process. The Appeal Tribunal is publishing its decisions and
after one and one half years of operation, it appears to be quickly breaking new ground and establishing new interpretations of the legislation.
However, there is not yet a discernible trend towards greater levels of
compensation for occupational disease. As is the case in Michigan, more
effort is needed in educating the medical community and the workers and
employers about workplace hazards.
The ultimate recommendation in Weiler's study of the Ontario system
was to move towards a comprehensive disability insurance plan such as
exists in New Zealand. This proposal was even aired recently in the
Ontario legislature. Since Canada already has a form of socialized
medicine, and since several provinces have implemented no fault automobile insurance, the suggestion is not as revolutionary to Ontarians as it
would probably be to the people of Michigan in spite of Michigan's no
fault auto insurance. However, such a system is unlikely in the near
future although it does potentially offer the surest way to ensure coverage for occupational disease.
CONCLUSION
Meaningful reform in the area of compensation for occupational disease
is long overdue. Without reform, victims of workplace induced disease
will be forced to rely on social systems which were not meant to bear the
burden or the risk of occupational illness. The argument of cost which is
constantly raised is a specious one as the real question is not whether
compensation is affordable but rather who should pay for it. When the
employer escapes liability, compensation costs fall on the workers themselves and onto society at large. No incentives are created to persuade
employers to maintain safer workplaces. The end result is a weakened
compensation system which is neither fair nor efficient and which is
largely in breach of the original trade off agreement between workers
and their employers.
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In Ontario, there seems to be some recognition of occupational disease as
a pressing problem. The new Industrial Disease Standards Panel has the
potential to widen and expand the guidelines where this is appropriate.
The Worker Compensation Appeals Tribunal has already displayed a
willingness to review and reinterpret the Ontario Worker's
Compensation Act. It remains to be seen if there will be an upward trend
in compensating workplace induced cancer.
In Michigan, an opposite trend seems to be developing. There appears to
be a real reluctance to increase the opportunity for disease compensation
and a resistance to any meaningful reform in this area. While the 1972
National Commission on Workman's Compensation suggested a number of
reforms to enhance the likelihood of coverage of occupational disease,
for the most part these recommendations have been ignored. Without
the political will to move ahead, the prospects for reform in Michigan
are slight. Instead, workers afflicted with disease, or their survivors,
will likely continue the trend towards third party actions to avoid the
ineffectiveness of the compensation system. Ultimately the historic
agreement between workers and management will be jeopardized and the
worker compensation system will be bypassed and weakened.

